Thephenomenon of Islamist radicalisation has nowadays taken on epidemic dimensions,w hich are moreo rl ess substantiald epending on the country,d imensions that need to becomei ntelligible at the intersection of subjectivity, politics and history. Thejunction of these three coordinates is necessary, because no univocal point of view allows the summarisation of the facts.Here Iwould like to propose an approachinwhich the parameter of subjectivity does notelude the other two.
My remarks concern the issue of radicalisation in France,where Iwork on the clinicaland research level. Iwill start by recallingsome data that was made public by the Ministry of Internal Affairs;t his data can be found in several reports commissioned by the government, of which the most completeand interesting is the one by deputy SØbastien Pietrasanta, published in June 2015. 1 Until June 2015 therewere 4462 individuals in France signalisedasradicalised. Saying "signalised individuals" means that this is the known part of an otherwise larger reality.Here some notable characteristics of this population: -2 5%are minors -3 5%are women -4 0%have converted to Islam (the converts represent 50 %ofthose who travel to the combat zones) -2 /3 are aged between 15 and 25.
If we move from the aspect of radicalisation to that of engagementinwar zones, we notice the following: -7 00 young people have gone to these zones -4 75 are currently in Iraq and Syria -2 20 have come back to France -1 800 individuals are said to be implicated in jihadist networks.T hese figures make France the Western Europeanc ountry in which the most citizens contribute to jihadism. Moreover it is estimatedt hat the number of European combatants of the 20.000 strangerscurrently present in Iraq and above all Syria is about 5000.
Many of the candidatesf or jihad,w ho are getting youngera nd younger and belong to all social classes, are unknowntothe policeforces. According to asurvey by the Centre de prØvention des dØrives sectairesl i Ø es à lislam (CPDSI) 2 of 160 families receivedbythe centre: -6 0%of the young people (belonging to those families and involved in jihadism) belong to the middle class -3 0%to thelower (and least affluent) class -1 0%to theupper class.
Even if those numbers are not representative of the totality of the radicalised, they show that radicalisation is not specific to the working classo rt he banlieue.W e have indeed been witnessing an extension of the phenomenon to the middle class ever since the expansionofthe civil war to the whole of Syria and the appearance of Daesh, also called the "Islamic State". Farhad Khosrokhavar distinguishes the radicalised of the lower class and those of the middle classbyreference to their trajectory and the motives for their engagement. According to Pietrasantasr eport there are Atheists and youths without any connection to immigrationa mong this population.I na ddition,t herei sa ni ncreasing proportion of departures that involve families and women, which is new for jihadism:one goes to Syria to build alife and to start afamily. Theproject of the "Islamic State"attracts certain young people and not only those from Muslim families.
2T his survey focuses on 160 families receivedinthe Centre de prØvention des dØrives sectaires liØes à lislam (CPDSI, in English:C entre of prevention of sectarian misdemeanour linkedtoIslam): Bouzard /Caupenne /V alsan 2014. 3K hosrokhavar 2015. This data shows us ad iversityt hat produces great difficulties in establishing profiles in generala nd particularly with regardt ot he "average"r adicalised or jihadist candidate.F rom as ociological point of view the examinedg roup constitutesaheterogeneous whole,which does not allow going beyond noticing recurrences in the path and the processofradicalisation.
However, themost prominent element of this picture -that 2/3 are aged between 15 and 25 -s eems to me to be av ery important fact. It means that the majority of the so-called "radicalised"c omprises either adolescents or young adults that find themselves in the moratoryz one where the crossing of adolescence may lead to its extension and aprolonged state of crisis.Little use has been made of this fact in order to understand the sources of radicalisation. There is no question of reducing the latter to ac ausality considered to be mechanically linked to the troubles of adolescence -here as much as anywhere else it would be an error to isolate one single causal element. Thei dea is rather to includet he element of "prolonged adolescence" into afactorial multiplicitywhich leads to a condensation in the form of radicalisation, or of which radicalisation is the condensation.
This is whenweneed to keep in mind the anthropological fact of the extension of adolescence,inparticular sincethe second half of the twentieth century,which is characterised by an increasingly shorter childhood and an increasingly delayed maturity,b oth of which have become one of the marks of modern civilisation beyond the sole occidentalarea. So much so that the notions of "preadolescence" and "post-adolescence" have been suggested and that the services of the infantile and juvenilepsychiatric sectoraroundthe world receive youths up to the age of 26 and sometimes even beyond.T he extension of adolescence between "pre" and "post" startingfrom puberty signifies that thereisajuvenile temporality that is adjustable to the individuals and the sociocultural environment. This observation leads me to interpret the afore-mentioned clinically corroborateddata according to that juvenile temporality.T he first angle of this interpretation results from what all clinicians of adolescence and its extension know, which is that this young population findsitself at the stage of life that centres on ideality. In the backgroundt he reorganisation of identity takes place,areorganisation which can be tumultuouswith variations that can go from normalcy up to the pathological.
In my opinion the appropriate angle of approach is thus the one concerned with the issue of the ideals throughw hich the individual and the collective, the subjectiveand the politicalare intertwined in the developmentofthe subject, at the very moment where atransformation of identity takes place in juvenile temporality.Y et the ideals raisingthe edifice of the subject, rooting it in acommunity, hingingittothe precedinggenerations and carrying it towards the desire to create 4I nthe 1960s thepsychiatrist PierreMâle proposed the notionof"juvenile crisis", which correspondstothat extended adolescence.See Mâle 1982. ab etterw orld, these ideals can also become the source of excess,t error and ravagesbeyond mention. Thet wentieth century was acentury of political catastrophes induced by the exaltation of ideals on the area of entire civilisations.In this regard Europe has paid avery high human price.
Idealsh ence contain potential and explosiver adicalness of which the manifestationsdepend on the individual variations and the social and historic context. Theepidemic dimension of "Islamist radicalisation" is aconfiguration of recent idealistic enthusiasm specific to the Muslim world and its crisis of civilisation, but it has becomeglobal and has acquired the powertocollect negativity within and beyond this world. The power to collect negativity in the sense that this configuration shelters and nourishes frustration, hate,self-rejection and the rejection of the world at its currentstage,which all find an "ecological niche" (in the sensein which Ian Hacking 5 uses this expression) in the ideal of radical Islamism. This notion makes it possible to take into account the conditions that allow asocial and psychological epidemic to erupt (the "mad travellers" of the nineteenth century in the work of Ian Hacking), to develop,toproliferate in aparticular cultural and historicspace,and finally to get extinguishedaswould aspecies that does not find adequate living conditions anymore.
One cannot understand the jihadist offer and its impact, if we do not analysethe developmentalc onditionso ft he "ecological niche" of the Islamist ideal on a demographic, economic, political and geopolitical level. Important papersh ave been dedicated to this subject, like those by Olivier Roy.
6 But the parameter of individual and collective psychology is absentinthe study of the conditions of the "ecological niche" of the radical Islamist ideal. This is what Idedicate my work to.
In ordertomeasure the function of ideals in juvenile temporality the issue of identity characteristic for this period has to be kept in mind.
What constitutes the crisis of this life period is the subjective transition in which the ideals of childhood are smashed to pieces and the necessity to replace them with new ideals imposes itself with an avidity that bears witness to the urgencyof the quest. Theavidity of ideals: this critical momentischaracterised by intense movements of "dis-idealisation" and "re-idealisation".I nd is-idealisation the subjectcollapses,falls into the "doldrums", 7 as Winnicott called it, which means that it feels emptiness,boredom,depression,the absence of meaninginits life and belittles itself.Inre-idealisationitexperiences exaltation, the impetus of ideas and passions,the attempt of elevatingits self-representation, the desire to set out for a new world or to participate in its creation, the aspiration of finding ap lenary meaning throughwhich truth and justice can triumph.
Whence does this necessity,urgency and avidityofideals come?Fromthe fact that the subject has to appropriate itself,this self that is not that of the child that 5H acking 2002. 6R oy 1992. 7W innicott 1965. developed with the help of the parents,but aself supposed to become the subjects own. Henceforth it wants to "belong" to itself by reinventing itself.However this appropriation forces it to undertaket he reorganisation of the most crucial boundaries of human existence:between the me and the non-me,life and death, its sex and the other sex, reality and fiction, the world and the hereafter etc. This is not agame with limits,orifitisone,itisadangerous game where the borders risk becoming blurred or partially vanishing. This is when the subjectssurvival is at stake.Ifittakes such risks that is because, through the peril it faces,itaspires to conquer itself and to master its owne xistence. This explains the frequency of transgressive experiences in which the borders of the self are stretched, and, to some extent, adolescent suicide attempts.Acting out often includesthe desire of transformation, of leaving oness kin in order to get an ew one,l ike this young woman who declared:"Iwanted to kill myself,but Idid not want to die." All in all, there is aperilous passage describedbythe poet Rainer Maria Rilke in the verse "What was is notanymore and not yet whatwill be". He designates thus acaesura, an interval, the passage fromone shore to the other that has to be overcomeinthe hope for anew self and anew world.
This crossing gives rise to the critique of the world of appearances on which childhood is largely based, to the doubting of the ideas of the adults,whose beliefs are perceived as illusions or conspiracies against truth and justice by the youth who consequently wishes to dismantle them. One mightcall this ajuvenile revolution. However, in manycases this reorganisation of the boundaries and the will to master oneself lead to extreme andd angerous experiments.T hey border on ordeal-like behaviour where the youth exposes himself to experiences of which the outcome will serve as judgment on his dignity or indignity,h is value or insignificance,his ability or impotence.Itisabout surviving these trials that can take on diverse forms.T his is where "radicalisation",r egardless of its ideological content, can present itself as some kind of probation and the solution for overcomingthe hiatus indicated by Rilkesverse.
"What was is not anymoreand not yet whatwill be", it is in this in-between, in this passage from one shore to the other and its deviations that the pointofthe impactofthe jihadist offer is located. Its discourse and the recruitment procedures make use of many of the motives of the subjective juveniletransition,like ahunter who sets up the traps knowing his preyspath.
These young people at whom the offer is aimed are expectingatransition;they are on the look-out for asolution or in the middle of the ford. Particularly on the look-out are those for whom the adolescent passage is difficult because of personal flaws that result from mishaps in their life and/or failures in their family or social environment.They do not necessarily show obvious troubles.Insome cases they experience secret or hiddenturmoil that we will call asymptotic and those are the mostu npredictable ones,s ometimes the most dangerous.T his will manifest itself after some violent acting out through other peoplesstatements such as:"He was av ery kind boy,h ew as helpful, he helped the old lady from the fifth floor carry her shopping bags,etc."Inother cases,one noticeschaotic journeys afterwards,that had already manifested themselves through delinquencyoraddiction; some of them reveal borderline or psychotic troubles.
Theoffer of radicalisation creates ademand in the subjectsstate of identityrelated fragility,w hich the offer transformsi nto powerful armour. When the conjunction of supplyand demandtakes place,the flaws are compensated, buried. Forthe subject this results in the sedation of its anguish, afeeling of liberation, rushes of omnipotence.Itbecomes someone else,chooses another name.Itadopts the same behaviourasthe members of its group.Ifthe discourse of all radicalised people seems as if it was held by the same person, this is due to the abdicationofa large part of their singularity: the subjecty ields to the fanatical automaton. The sacrifice of its singularity indeed frees it from its symptoms to the exact extent that psychological symptoms are correlative of the individualsi diosyncrasy.T he symptoms,which are accounts of intimate conflicts,are converted into collective formations.The elimination of all singularity and the absorption of the symptoms in radicalisation are at the origin of the errors of assessment of many (clinically un-trained)observers on supposedly "psychologically problem-free" radicalised people,even though theirsubjective trajectory has been tumultuous, sometimes even so risky that radicalisationi sa na ttempt at survivingastate of interior urgency.
This being said one should not confoundexplaining and excusing. Theanalysis of the subjacent subjective reality of this phenomenon signifies neither insanity nor irresponsibility, with the exception of certain cases.
This approach also allows us to understand the success of radicalI slamism among converts.Identity flaws are not the prerogative of the childrenofmigrants of Muslimf amilies,w hich explains that 40 %o ft he radicalised are converts.I would say that these subjects try to radicalise themselves before being introduced to the productofradicalisation. It does not matter whether they know of what this product is made,aslong as it brings them "the solution". Thepress has reported the case of jihadistsw ho had ordered books like "Islam for Dummies" on the internet. One needs an important dose of ignorance in order for onesfantasies to wrap themselves in innocence and to look for their realisationw ithout fear nor doubt.The examiningmagistrate Marc Tr Ø vidic of the antiterrorist centre in Paris has declared on several occasions that certain returnees from the combat zones whom he interrogated did not know the five pillars of Islam! Some of the volunteers in the combat zones do not primarily look for the spiritual dimension or ar eligious conversion. They want to rebel against the injustice suffered by the Syrians through the regimeo fB ashara l-Assad. For others the departure towards the mysteriouswar-torn East servesasaromantic and initiatory passage.Itstruck me to read texts on the history of the crusades and to notice numerous similarities to "the subjective venture"ofthesedepartures to Jihad. Could jihadism be an inverted crusade: a"crescentade"? Today,radical Islamism is the most widespread product on the internet market, the most exciting, the most unabridged.Itisthe master key to idealisation readily available to those having lost hope withr egards to themselves and the world.
Theassimilation of Islamist radicalisation to asectarian phenomenonislargely erroneous.Thereare some comparable aspects,like the phenomenon of "mental control", but essential differences are apparent. In asect the individual submits to his fantasies or the delirious theories of the guru, to his economic or even sexual exploitation. As to the jihadist, he adherest oavery large collectiveb elief,t he belief in the identity myth of Islamism, which is nourished by the reality of war and in which he is offered to take ah eroic part by means of material and sexual advantages,real and imaginary powers.The mixtureofmyth and historic reality is more toxic than beingindelirium would be.
Theradical offer will thus seize the impasses of the juvenilepassage and model itself on the possibilitieso fac rossing that is at the same time individual and collective,physical and metaphysical, mythical and historical, of which Iwish to show the main motives.
1. Identity-related justice is the cornerstone of the radical and jihadist offer. It toucheso nt he heart of the identity flaws of young people.I ti sbased upon the theory of "the wounded Islamic ideal" and the wrong having been done to Muslims in the past and the present. This wounded ideal is linkedtothe loss of the principle of theological and political sovereignty of the Muslim community with the abolition of the Caliphate and the dismemberment of the last Muslim empire, the Ottoman Empire, in 1924 by the colonial powers.Itshouldbenoted that the organisation of the Muslim Brothers was founded in 1928. One could say that Islamist movements were born of the trauma of this period and have propagated this shock to the masses.Asfor the wrong done to the Muslims:the ancient and recent wars in the Middle East;P alestine,A fghanistan, Iraq, etc. Pictures of destruction, massacre and dead and mutilated childrens erve as support,a long with the appeal to become arighter of wrongs.One observes that there are young people who are not Muslims who respond to this call for justice.B ut for the majority the jihadist offer consists of placingt he wrong done to the Muslim community on top of an already previously experienced individual prejudice. It aims at having the subject absorbed by the wounded ideal and the injury and to speak and act through it like arevenant. It is calledtobecomethe avenger of the ideal or, what amountstothe same thing, the avenger of the offendeddeity. The case of the Kouachi brothers in the attackagainst Charlie Hebdo is paradigmatic in this regard. There are young people whom the deficiency of the ego ideal (idØal du moi)leads to look for an incarnation of the collective ideal, which is at its fullest in the act of becomingamartyr.
2. Dignification and access to omnipotence: To young people who lack selfesteem, who have the feeling of being stifled, of having no value and "beingtrash", as one of them told me,one offers the recognition not only of theirhaving been harmed, but also of being one of Godselect, underestimated by everyone.Totake on this chosen destiny,the youth has to inspire respect and fear, become amissionary of the cause,ahero to whom the gates of glory will open. He can take the law into his ownhands,heisauthorized to be outside of it in thename of Gods superior law."Thetrash" thus becomes fearsome.Fearsome and feared by his own family.Afather told me:"My son has become my father, he dictatesthe morals of Islam to me… Evenm ore, he takesh imself for the father of God,a fter having been involved with drugsand delinquency."
3. Repentance and purification: Islamist radicalism is ar eligious ideologyo f which one of the fundamentals is repentance and purification. It deals with the culpabilityofliving and desiring that one finds among young people who sometimes have not committed asinglecrime.T he torment indeed intensifies where there is misfortune and shameofexisting. Particularly with identity troubles:The subjecttells itself that it has no value,that it is a"defect", accordingtothe words of apatient. But the offer also reaches delinquents looking for forgiveness(there are delinquents who are such due to afeeling of culpability, as Freud pointed out) or delinquents who find am eans of ennobling their criminal urges through their enrolment in jihadism.T he offerofradicalisation reflects unto us this message: Youare unworthy because you are godless and lawless,you have the possibilityto expiateand to ask for forgiveness:become a"Supermuslim"! Ic all Supermuslim the position in which aM uslim is brought to outbid the Muslim that he is through the representation of aMuslim that has to be even more Muslim. This is the behaviour of as ubject that is prey to its own reproaches of defection and the harassment by the armyofmedia preachers who accuse it all day long of the worst moral crimes and doom it to be "a combustible in hell". It is called to "over-identify" with the exemplary Muslim, the prophet and the perfect ancestor by establishing aborderagainst the impure by joiningthe group of the pure,even at the cost of challenging its own parents and family,whom it will save duringthe Last Judgment.
4. The restoration of the subject of community versusthe subject of society: Therestoration of the subjectofcommunity is associated withthe promiseofthe return to the world of tradition, where beingas ubject is given,e nsured, guaranteed. By contrast the subject of modern civilisation, of socialc ontract, the individual as such is the blockbuster of itself and in order for it to be that,i ti s forcedt oa ccomplish exhausting work. One needs them eansf or that.O ne exampleo ft he guarantee given to the subject of community:W hen one offers a youth of 16 years old to choose another name for himself that starts with "A bou X" (Abou Ali,Abou Salah), which means "Fatherof…", then, even though he is not afather in reality,byrenaming himself he jumpsfrom the condition of being a son to the conditionof"being afather",becomingthus the origin of an imaginary posterity.Hehence becomeshis own origin. Today there are young people who preferthe reassuring order of acommunity with restrictive norms, allocating them to an authoritarianstructure that relievesthem of the disarray of freedomand of a personal responsibility for which they do not have the resources,m eaning the psychological and materialresources.
5. The elimination of the boundary between life and death: Thep reachers discourse penetrates the unconscious fantasies of the adolescents at the moment where they go through the process of reorganising the infantile theorieso ft he boundaries between life and death. They saturate them with litanies on imminent or already present death, on the throes of the grave(aterrifying type of sermon), throes that they have to spare themselves from now on as if they were already dead. Imaginary death is so invasive that real death becomes insignificant, which explains that someyoung recruits declare:"Death is nothing, itslike apinch."A pinch that transports them to the paradisiac otherworld. In the case of the man killed in battle, the martyr, he is only apparently dead;hestays alive,enjoying all his possessions, being thus an immortal. Thesubject hence has to die in order to get access to this immortal life.T he recurrence of the desire to die and even the desire of alreadybeing dead is aconstant fact in the discourse of the jihadist offer. Because when somebody already feels dead nothing can happen to him anymore, apart from living in the currentw orld, whichi sc onsidered as being vile.I nh is excellent book of testimony Les FranÅais jihadistes,
8 David Thomson reportsthe words of ayouth that told him:" Allahdecrees our death even beforeour birth." This affirmation does not existinthe traditional corpus of Islam. This would mean that what we call "the primitive scene"i np sychoanalysis,t he scene of the fantasies on the origins of life,i sas cene of annihilation and thus the source of a melancholy feeling of self-loss and of matrix fusion witht he forces of life and death alike.
Thej ihadist offer correspondst herefore to ap olicy oriented towardst he triumph over death:what one could call a thanatopolicy.
9 But the type of death in question contains some superior form of life.I no ur eyes death is opposed to narcissism, but here death is at the service of narcissism. Death is amother that gives birth to the candidate for aperfect life.The candidate gives up his life,which is the life of agood-for-nothing and therefore has no value,tothe totally Other and expects that the latterwill make it perfect for him.Aperfectlife is alife where the ideal prevailsover the ego which is liberated from everything in the world.Itis very well possible that heresome subjects find the possibility of converting suicide into self-sacrifice,b ut self-sacrifice in jihadism involvesw hat Lacan calledt he "supreme narcissism of the lost Cause".
10 This is the experience we make of the incomparable dignity that every man who has lost his life acquires in our eyes. Somebodysd eath constitutes the most powerful and ultimate assertiono ft he value of his existence. 8T homson 2014. 9I nthe original: thanatopolitique [translatorsnote] . 10 In the original "narcissisme suprÞme de la Cause perdue", in Lacan 1966, p. 826. 6. Atheory of evil and regeneration: One of the fears of adolescence is related to the access to the adult world and its logic, particularly to the game of social pretending that the youth loathes for its dishonesty.Y et the jihadist offer tries to persuade the youth that theworldinwhichhelives is corrupted, unjust, wrapped into falsehood: avile world.
11 Thus the centrality of conspiracy theories,which are supposed to unveil hidden duplicity and malfeasance.F rom this the appeal to becomethe chastener of hypocrites (especially false Muslims or whatone might call "Islamoids") and an operatoro ft he regeneration of the Muslim world is deduced. Iwill be succinct about this,because one finds the motive of the eradication and regeneration of the world in many totalitarian ideologies,for example in the Nazi or the Khmer rouge ideology.
7. The completion of meaning and the Last Judgment: Thejuvenile transition is ap eriod of meaning-related deadlock, existential absurdity and shapedb yi nvasive wavesofemotions thatare difficult to link and organise.The senselessness destabilises identity bearingsa nd provokesf ears of estrangementa nd endless decomposition.The transition placesthe subjectinastate of expectation,where it waits for the moment when it will finally take on solid shape and the incessant flow of ideas will end. Yetthe extremist Islamist discourse is asupplierofsigns from all quarters which announces the end of timea nd the total closure of meaning through millenarian and apocalyptic themes.Currently,this discourse situates the end of the world in Syria,byusingaprophecy as an excuse,aprophecy which is often repeatedb yy oung people who claim to want to go to Syria in order to participate in the end of the world, after the reestablishment of the Caliphate of which the "Islamic State" is the realisation. Thea pocalypse is the disclosure of meaning and its achievement, the final triumph,m elancholy,c ertainly,b ut not void of the premature pleasure of the definitive victory of Islam.The apocalypse is atotalpurificationthat proceeds in the form of the disappearance of the world and the coming of the reign of the other world.
Theenumeration that Ihave undertaken is not exhaustive, one could elaborate on the motives,b ut the powero ft he Islamist offer resides in its system that promises young people in crisis an exhilarating crossing at the very momenttheir existence has got entangledinnegativity,distress and absurdity.
